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What We Owe Our Coal Miners
Anne Marie Lofaso*
INTRODUCTION
Workplace hazards, such as those existing in coal mines, present an
acceptable-risk problem: "they require a choice among alternative courses
of action . . . [where] at least one alternative option includes a threat to life
or health among its, consequences."' Recognizing that acceptable-risk
problems require choices that are "dependent on values, beliefs, and other
factors," it becomes useful to separate the facts from those values.2 This
essay is committed to both-presenting an accurate picture of factual
hazards inherent in coal mining and clarifying the values underlying poten-
tial policy choices.
One value that often remains implicit but that forms the basis of the
deregulatory position is efficiency. While there are several measures of effi-
ciency, law and economics scholars typically use Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a
measure of economic efficiency that requires "not that no one be made
worse off by the move [Pareto efficiency], but only that the increase in
[economic] value be sufficiently large that the losers could be fully com-
pensated."3 The losers here are the coal miners who have lost their lives or
health. Coal mine operators, the winners, are legally forced to compensate
miners or their families for the miners' loss, but for less than the cost of
making the workplace safer.
It is difficult to assess workplace health and safety policies abstractly in
a system that values efficiency. Implicit in any such calculation is the belief
that the free market is the best gauge for determining efficiency and, there-
fore, acceptable risk. The question then becomes, what does the free market
value? Some say profit maximization. Others say the social good. At
worst, social good equates with profit or wealth maximization as its proxy.
At best, the social good is conterminous with human life but more often
* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. Many thanks to those
who have commented on early drafts of this Essay and/or who have conversed with me about
this essay, especially Robert Bastress, Clifford Hawley, Jim Heiko, Joyce McConnell, Patrick
McGinley, Michael Risch, Daolu Tang, Jena Martin Amerson, and to the West Virginia Uni-
versity College of Law Faculty and library staff. Thanks to Daniel J. Bums, Jenny Flanigan,
Travis Sayre, Nicholas Stump, Christopher J. Williamson, Matthew T. Yanni, and the editors of
the Harvard Law & Policy Review for their research assistance. And thanks to all the coal
miners, especially Donnie Hayhurst, who have spoken to me about coal mine safety. This
essay is dedicated to the 29 coal miners who tragically lost their lives in the Upper Big Branch
explosion. All errors are the author's.
'BARUCH FIsCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 2 (1981).
2 Id. at xii.
Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980).
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consists of a combination of goods, which might include some value on
human life or worker dignity.
For those of us who more directly value human life, the acceptable risk
level does not necessarily coincide with the efficient result of the free mar-
ket. This leads back to our initial question: What is an acceptable risk in
hazardous workplaces, such as coal mines? From my perspective, we need
to look at this question in another way: What does society owe workers,
such as coal miners, who voluntarily enter hazardous workplaces for the
greater good? Inspired by Harvard philosopher Thomas M. Scanlon's con-
tractualism, I further recast the question as follows: How do we justify dan-
gerous jobs? To justify such jobs, we must present reasons that "no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general
agreement." 4
This essay attempts to present such a justification. In particular, I argue
that, while targeted regulation could conceivably improve current industry
safety and health records, those records would benefit more directly by im-
posing the union model on the mining industry. The purpose of this Essay is
not so much to argue in favor of greater safety regulations, but to demon-
strate that collective bargaining above the regulatory floor is likely to result
in safer, healthier mines, and that the safety records of such mines will be
better justified when based on informed, unforced, general agreement.
I commence this argument in Part I with background information about
the coal mining industry, focusing on the underground mining that occurs in
Appalachia. This section demonstrates the power disparity between coal
mine operators and their miners, making coal miners an ideal class of work-
ers who would benefit from collective bargaining and other forms of con-
certed activity.
In Part II, I describe the law's role in ensuring coal mine safety. There,
I briefly describe the federal regulatory floor above which states and private
actors, through contracts, may rise. I show that increased safety has corre-
lated with more comprehensive regulation. I also discuss current incentives
to circumvent mining regulations.
In Part III, I identify several market failures-inequality of bargaining
power, irrationality in assessing risk, asymmetrical information, and monop-
sony-all of which union mines are particularly well suited to remedy. I use
this section to describe union safety committees and bargaining obligations
and miners' rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to ex-
plain the role that private actors play in creating safer and healthier
workplaces.
In Part IV, I argue that extending the union model to nonunion mines
should resolve many mine safety issues. I conclude that mine safety would
improve even more if policy makers were to empower miners through any
4 THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 153 (1998). 1 wish to thank the late
C. Edwin Baker for pointing out the connection between my thoughts on coal mine safety and
Scanlon's contractualism in a conversation we had in 2007.
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one of several forms of industrial participatory democracy, ranging from
mandatory notice posting of workers' rights in nonunion and union mines to
extending mandatory bargaining over safety issues to nonunion mines.
I. BACKGROUND: ESTABLISHING SOME OFTEN OVERLOOKED BUT
RELEVANT FACTS OF COAL MINING
A. The Human Cost of Meeting Global Energy Demand Through
Coal Mining
Since the Sago disaster of January 2006, the United States has wit-
nessed three more major underground coal mining disasters-all in nonun-
ion mines-which, together with the Sago disaster, have taken the lives of
fifty-two miners.' In addition to these disasters, which tend to catch the
public's attention, hundreds of miners have died one by one, in accidents
such as collapsed roofs that do not make headline news. 6 Between 1996 and
2005, nearly 10,000 miners died of black lung disease.'
The most recent coal mine disaster at the nonunion mine at Upper Big
Branch (UBB) poignantly illustrates this human cost. At 3:02 in the after-
noon on Monday, April 5, 2010,8 "a massive explosion on a scale that is
nearly incomprehensible ripped through the [UBB] Mine" in a small West
Virginia town.9 That explosion, which instantly took the lives of twenty-
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HISTORICAL DATA ON MINE
DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/
MSHAFCT8.HTM [hereinafter "MSHA Historical Data"] (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library). A "disaster" is defined as an accident that takes five or more lives. Id.
Between 2005 and 2009, the total number of mining fatalities was 285. MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH AT A GLANCE (2010),
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCTIO.HTM (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library). The nonunion/union status of the mines involved in those disasters can
be found at Press Release, United Mine Workers of America, UMWA Statement on Incident at
Upper Big Branch Mine, Apr. 5, 2010, available at http://www.umwa.org/?q=news/umwa-
statement-incident-upper-big-branch-mine; Press Release, United Mine Workers of America,
Crandall Canyon Families, UMWA Tell Congress: Now is the Time to Make Change, Oct. 3,
2007, available at http://www.umwa.org/?q= news/crandall-canyon-familes-umwa-tell-con-
gress-now-time-make-change; Press Release, United Mine Workers of America, UMWA Des-
ignated as Representative in Darby Investigation, May 31, 2006, available at http://
www.umwa.org/?q=node/104; Press Release, United Mine Workers of America, Technology,
Information, Knowledge Available that Could Have Alleviated Sago Disaster, Jan. 17, 2007
available at http://www.umwa.org/?q=node/132.
6 Ken Ward Jr., Beyond Sago: One by One, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 2006, at 1E,
available at http://wvgazette.com/News/BeyondSago/200611050006.
'See I NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL AND PREVENTION, WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE (WORLD) SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM,
§ 2 tbl.2-1 (2009), available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/drds/WorldReportData/pdf/2008TO2-
01.pdf.
'MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BRIEFING ON DISASTER AT
MASSEY ENERGY'S UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE-SouTH 2 (2010), available at http://www.msha.
gov/PerformanceCoal/DOL-MSHA-presidentreport.pdf.
9 The Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster: Testimony of Family Members: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 11 Ith Cong. (2010) (statement of Rep. George Miller,
Harvard Law & Policy Review
nine coal miners and seriously injured two others, 0 is the worst United
States coal mining disaster in forty years."
Although the twenty-nine miners died instantly, the relatives of several
miners did not immediately learn the fate of their relatives. 2 Instead, as is
so often the case with mine disasters,'" family members and others gathered
together, "watching, hoping and praying for survivors to emerge from the
darkness into the arms of their loved ones." 4 By Tuesday, officials had
accounted for all but four miners.' Rescue efforts for the missing miners
were delayed because of dangerously high levels of methane, a combustible
gas that is often the catalyst in a coal mine explosion. 6 It was not until
Friday morning-three and a half days after the explosion-that officials
could confirm that those missing had perished in the blast."
In addition to putting themselves at risk of physical danger, coal miners
also face enormous health risks.'" Pneumoconiosis (black lung) is a disease
caused by coal dust accumulating in the lungs. According to the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), approximately one in
ten U.S. miners with twenty-five years' tenure develop the simple form of
black lung, "coal workers' pneumoconiosis."l 9 The growing black lung
rates among younger, less experienced miners is even more alarming.20
Health and safety officials believe that these rates are attributable to longer
shifts and better technology. Longer shifts mean more dust with less time to
cough the dust out of the lungs, 21 while better technology, especially in
Chairman, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). MSHA's briefing described the explosion as
"catastrophic" and "massive." MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 8, at 2.
0 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 8, at 2.
"MSHA Historical Data, supra note 5.
12 See David A. Fahrenthold, Even After 25 Men Die, 'We Still Have Hope', WASH. POST,
April 7, 2010, at A-1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/
2010/04/05/ST2010040505519.html?sid= ST2010040505519.
3 See Anne Marie Lofaso, Approaching Coal Mine Safety from a Comparative Law and
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 111 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2008).
14 156 CONG. REc. H2538 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement of Rep. Nick Rahall).
'" See Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 2010 at 8-A,
available at http://wvgazette.com/News/montcoal/201004100542.
16 Ken Ward Jr., Gary A. Harki, & Kathryn Gregory, Search for Missing Miners Delayed,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 5, 2010, http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201004050545 (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
" Ken Ward Jr. and Andre Clevenger, Missing Miners Found Dead; Death Toll Reaches
29 in Raleigh Explosion, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Apr. 10, 2010) at IA, available at http://
wvgazette.com/News/201004090857.
" See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Douglas G. Olson, An Analysis of the Black Lung Com-
pensation Program, 41 J. RISK & INS. 633, 644-47 nn.44-48 (1974) (discussing black lung
disease as an externality).
1 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP OF LABOR, END BLACK LUNG Act
Now! 3, available at http://www.msha.gov/S&HINFO/BlackLung/2009Charts/BlackLung
Charts2009.pdf (showing the rates and trends of coal miners with the simple form of black
lung known as coal workers' pneumoconiosis).
20 Kris Maher, Black Lung on Rise in Mines, Reversing Trend, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009
at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126083871040391327.html.
21 Brenda Wilson, The Quiet Deaths Outside the Coal Mines, NAT'L PuB. RADIO (April 16,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 126021059 (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
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longwall mining, can lead to the inhalation of the much more dangerous
silica dust.22
B. Power Disparity Between Coal Mine Operators and Miners in Light
of Global Energy Demand
1. Significance of the Coal Mining Industry in Meeting Global
Energy Demand
Coal is used worldwide, primarily to generate electricity. According to
the World Coal Institute, coal currently supplies over forty-one percent of
global electricity.23 Coal provides almost half of U.S. electricity.2 4 In the
United States, about ninety-three percent of the coal consumed is used to
generate electricity, while the rest is used for various industrial purposes.25
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA) estimates that
coal will continue to play an important role in meeting global energy de-
mands for the foreseeable future. According to the U.S. EIA's 2010 Interna-
tional Energy Outlook, "total world consumption of marketed energy [will
increase] by 49 percent from 2007 to 2035."26 "[W]orld coal consumption
[in particular is expected to increase] by 56 percent from 2007 to 2035 and
coal's share of world energy consumption [to grow] from 27 percent in 2007
to 28 percent in 2035."27
Accordingly, despite the dangers, the coal-mining industry continues to
thrive. At current production levels, coal is predicted to continue to meet its
share of global energy needs through at least 2050,28 if not through the next
century. 29
Mine operators with poor safety records will also continue to flourish
for the foreseeable future. The UBB mine is owned by Performance Coal
Company, a subsidiary of Massey Energy, Inc. Massey Energy is one of the
largest coal-producing companies in the U.S. and the largest in Central Ap-
palachia.3 0 Massey Energy currently controls just under thirty-eight percent
22 Maher, supra note 20.
2 3 WORLD COAL Ass'N, COAL & ENERGY SECURITY, http://www.worldcoal.org/coal-soci-
ety/coal-energy-security/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).24 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 62 (2010),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2010).pdf.
" FRED FREME, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. COAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 2009 RE-
VIEw 8 (2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/coal/page/speciallarticle-dc.pdf.26 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 24, at 9.2 7 See id. at 61.
28 See MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL iX (2007), available at http://
web.mit.edu/coal/TheFuture of Coal.pdf. But see MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF
NATURAL GAS 26 fig. 3.3 (2010), available at http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/report-
natural-gas.pdf (predicting the demise of coal by 2035 where policies are enacted to encourage
substituting natural gas for coal to impact carbon dioxide emissions).
29 WORLD COAL Ass'N, supra note 23 (predicting coal availability for at least another 119
years).
30 Massey Energy, About Us, http://www.masseyenergyco.com/aboutlindex.shtml (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
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of the total coal reserves in Central Appalachia' and it predicts that it will
control sixty-seven percent of all such coal reserves by 2017.32
2. Factors Contributing to the Disempowerment of Coal Miners
Compared to mine operators, coal miners are in a relatively weak posi-
tion. The underground coal miners who work in the three major coal-pro-
ducing states (West Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania) typically live in
the surrounding Appalachian countryside. The mean annual wage of U.S.
coal miners ranges from $45,690 to $47,650.31 Appalachian coal miners
may not be as well compensated as other U.S. miners. In West Virginia, for
example, a state that has seen two of the five worst U.S. coal mining disas-
ters since 1940, according to the Mine Safety and Health Administration,3 4 a
miner's annual mean wage is about average for all U.S. miners but more
variable, ranging from $34,340 to $50,500.11
Miners are also compensated less than their supervisors and managers.
Massey's former Chairman, Don Blankenship, received $17 million in com-
pensation in 2009, which is about 340 times as much as an average West
Virginia miner earned.3 6
Appalachian miners are, however, well compensated for their local-
ity-isolated mining towns peppering Appalachia that constitute textbook
examples of labor market monopsony, which describes a situation where
there is a single buyer of labor or employer.37 The average annual wage for
all occupations in West Virginia is $34,580.31 According to the National Bi-
tuminous Coal Wage Agreement, the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the coal industry and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
I Massey Energy, Coal Reserves, http://www.masseyenergyco.com/company/coal
reserves.shtml (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting that Massey Energy
owns mines and processing facilities in West Virginia, Kentucky, and one in Virginia).
3 Id. On January 29, 2011, Massey Energy announced that it had been acquired by Alpha
Natural Resources, which has a somewhat better reputation for worker safety. See Mike Hall,
Rival Coal Finn Reaches Deal to Buy Massey Energy, AFL-CIO Now BLOG (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/02/01/rival-coal-firm-reaches-deal-to-buy-massey-energy/.
3 See Div. OF OCCUPATIONAL EMP T STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAY 2009 NATL
INDUS.-SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL EMPT AND WAGE ESTIMATES: NAICS 212100 - COAL MINING
(2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_2121 00.htm#00-0000 (specifically
with reference to job categories 47-5041 to 47-5061).
34 See MHSA Historical Data, supra note 5.
* See Div. OF OCCUPATIONAL EMP'T STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAY 2009 NATL
INDUS.-SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL EMP'T AND WAGE ESTIMATES: WEST VIRGINIA (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oesWV.htm (specifically with reference to job catego-
ries 47-5041 to 47-5061).
36 Ken Ward, Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship's Pay, CHARLESTOWN GAZETTE (Apr.
19, 2010), http://blogs.wvgazette.com/coaltattool2010/04/19/massey-energy-ceo-don-blanken-
ships-pay/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
37 William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 86, 102 (1997).
38 See Dv. OF OCCUPATIONAL EMP'r STATISTICS, supra note 35 (specifically referencing
"All Occupations").
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(the union that represents most U.S. union coal miners), union miners tend to
increase their base wages through working overtime.39
Contrary to basic economic theory, which predicts that unions increase
wages above a competitive level thereby reducing the number of jobs availa-
ble,40 nonunion miners are sometimes better paid than union miners-al-
though union miners tend to receive better benefits. 41 For example, some
Massey Energy subdivisions, including Performance Coal Company, offer
miners enhanced hourly rates in exchange for a three-year commitment to
work at their nonunion mine. Under Section II of this enhanced wage agree-
ment, the mine operator "reserves the right to terminate the miner's employ-
ment for lack of performance as determined by management, unacceptable
conduct, including, but not limited to, unacceptable work and absenteeism,
or a serious safety infraction." 4 2 And if a miner is terminated under Section
II or quits his job within the three-year period, the employee must repay the
enhanced wages to the company 43 and cannot work for another mine within
ninety miles for a year.44 In essence, miners who sign this contract make it
very expensive for themselves to leave and join a union.
The portrait of the Appalachian coal miner is not complete without un-
derstanding the "social inequalities and health disparities" that have long
characterized the region. 45 Appalachian coal-mining regions are plagued
with the same symptoms of poverty-drug abuse, subpar living conditions,
poor education-that typify our most blighted inner cities. But in addition
to these similarities, Appalachian poverty is often characterized by a lack of
economic diversification thereby resulting in few if any meaningful job op-
portunities. Coal mining might be the only industry for hundreds of miles in
these economically impoverished areas. Appalachian people, who also have
fewer educational opportunities than other Americans, 46 might have no
" National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 2007, art. IV, § (b) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
4See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984) (ex-
plaining this phenomenon and criticizing this view as too narrow); see generally C.J. Parsley,
Labor Union Effects on Wage Gains: A Survey of Recent Literature, 18 J. EcON. LIT. 1 (1980).
41 Interview with Donnie Hayhurst, Jr., General Inside Laborer (Coal Miner) and UMWA
member (Dec. 23, 2010) (discussing relative wages and benefits in union and nonunion mines
in which he has worked). Cf. William M. Boal & John Pencavel, The Effect of Labor Unions
on Employment, Wages, and Days of Operation: Coal Mining in West Virginia, 109 Q. J.
EcON. 267, 280-287 (1994) (demonstrating that union/nonunion wage ratios between 1897
and 1938 were much lower than previous studies suggested).
42 Enhanced Underground Hourly Rate Agreement and Covenant Not To Compete be-
tween Stanley Stewart and Performance Coal Company, at 1-2 (December 14, 2007) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
43 Id. at 2-3.
44Id. at 3-4.
45 Michael Hendryx, Mortality Rates in Appalachian Coal Mining Counties: 24 Years Be-
hind the Nation, 1 ENvTL. JUSTICE 1, 5 (2008).
46 See Thomas C. Shaw et al., Educational Attainment in Appalachia: Growing with the
Nation, But Challenges Remain, 10 J. APPALACHIAN STUDS. 307, 311 (2004) (stating that the
2000 Census "shows a persistent gap between the nation and Appalachia in terms of educa-
tional attainment").
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choice but to accept the relatively well-paying coal-mining job or (more
commonly) leave the region.
Nor is that portrait complete without understanding the century-long
battle history between U.S. miners attempting to improve their conditions
and mine owners determined to resist change.47 The Matewan Massacre, the
Battle of Blair Mountain, and the events leading to those struggles during the
early twentieth century perhaps best capture that history. Between 1912 and
1913, as the West Virginia coal mines were becoming organized, coal mine
operator resistance to the UMWA's demands resulted in a series of violent
strikes quelled only when the governor declared martial law and dispatched
1200 state militia soldiers.48 "Hundreds were arrested, tried, and impris-
oned, frequently receiving sentences more severe than could have been lev-
ied by civil courts under existing statutes." 49
Following a few years of industrial peace brokered by West Virginia
Governor Henry Hatfield, 0 labor unrest flared up again in 1920, when the
UMWA, led by union President John L. Lewis, attempted to organize the
southern coalfields of West Virginia. That spring, coal operators hired pri-
vate detectives from the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency to evict union min-
ers and their families from company-owned housing in Matewan, West
Virginia. Matewan Police Chief Sid Hatfield (a former coal miner) en-
couraged the residents to arm themselves, ultimately resulting in an ex-
change of gunfire that left seven Baldwin-Felts detectives and four Matewan
residents dead.' Sid Hatfield was later acquitted of murdering one of the
detectives, some of the survivors killed him in revenge. Commencing on
August 24, over 10,000 miners wearing red bandanas (thereby earning the
name "red necks") marched in protest of Hatfield's murder. This time, the
governor requested the aid of President Warren G. Harding, who sent federal
troops to end the unrest, resulting in the infamous and bloody Battle of Blair
Mountain.5 2
These battles were set within a Lochner legal framework that viewed
unions as interfering with freedom of contract." For example, in 1917, in
Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld a district
court injunction against the UMWA for interfering with a mine operator's
yellow-dog contracts-agreements between the mine operator and the min-
47 See generally DAVID ALAN CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS:
THE SOUTHERN WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880-1922 (1981); LON SAVAGE, THUNDER IN THE
MOUNTAINS: THE WEST VIRGINIA MINE WAR 1920-21 (1990).
48 See generally W. Va. State Archives, W. Va. Div. of Culture and History, West Vir-
ginia's Mine Wars, http://www.wvculture.org/history/minewars.html (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
49 See Merle T. Cole, "Mere Military Color": The State Police and Martial Law, W. VA.
HisT. Soc'v Q. July 2003, available at http://www.wvculture.org/history/wvhsl731.html.
so See W. Va. State Archives, W. Va. Div. of Culture and History, Time Trail, West Vir-
ginia, http://www.wvculture.org/history/timetrl/ttapr.html#0414 (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
1' See W. Va. State Archives, supra note 48.
52 Id.
5 See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ers to prevent unionization.5 4 As a result of these judicial decisions and vio-
lent events, the UMWA lost most of its membership in the region until the
1930s, when Congress enacted federal legislation to protect workers' rights
to organize."
In sum, in isolated coal mining towns built around monopsonistic coal
mine operators, a dearth of meaningful alternative job opportunities, and en-
hanced wage agreements in exchange for noncompete promises like the ones
offered by Massey, together diminish employee bargaining power. Taken
within an historical context of worker oppression, these circumstances con-
spire to make Appalachian workers less mobile, first by funneling them into
the relatively well-paying mining jobs and then by making it more costly for
them to quit those jobs, even when faced with dangerous safety conditions.
These restraints on the free movement of labor result in labor market failure.
3. Examples of Unions-Then and Now-Redistributing Power
These conditions-the lack of economic diversification, a dearth of job
opportunities, health and safety risks inherent to one of the region's higher
paying jobs-combined with a history of worker exploitation and hostility to
workers' attempts to help themselves are precisely the conditions that Con-
gress had in mind when drafting the NLRA. Labor unrest such as violence
accompanying the Battle of Blair Mountain led members of Congress to
draw the conclusion that:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees ...
and employers . . . burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry
and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the
flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of in-
dustrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differ-
ence as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by re-
storing equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.5 6
54 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1917) (holding that
miners and mine operators may lawfully enter into contracts that prohibit union membership
and that the union interfered with contract by attempting to organize the miners); see also
UMWA v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
5 See generally ROBERT SHOGAN, THE BATTLE OF BLAIR MOUNTAIN: THE STORY OF
AMERICA'S LARGEST LABOR UPRISING, 117-118, 208-209 (Westview Press ed. 2004); see W.
Va. State Archives, supra note 48.
56 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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As the legislation's plain languages suggests, the NLRA is built on the pre-
mise that putting employees on equal footing with their employers is itself
necessary for industrial peace and commercial stability. The Supreme Court
then elevated those rights and policies in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., when it declared that those rights are "fundamental.""
These pro-union legal gains were short lived due to changes in the le-
gal, corporate, and economic landscape. In 1947, a Republican Congress
amended the NLRA to tip the balance back in the employer's favor by sub-
stantially narrowing the category of workers protected by the NLRA and by
removing some of labor's most important economic weapons. 8 Starting in
the 1980s, employers began to oppose unions more aggressively by "con-
test[ing] and delay[ing] NLRB elections, fir[ing] union activists, hir[ing]
antiunion consulting firms . . . and stall[ing] . . . first contract [negotia-
tions]." 9 The latter half of the twentieth century also witnessed a shift in
the U.S. economy from manufacturing to service-based work, spurred by
worker dislocation and global competition. Union membership as a percent-
age of total employment peaked from a high of thirty-seven percent in 1946
to a low of 7.2% in the private sector in 2009 (12.3% overall). 60
Today U.S. unions are scrambling to regain their foothold by working
primarily outside the law, especially the NLRA, to meet their objectives. In
particular, some unions "have begun to organize new members using a wide
variety of confrontational tactics, including massive street demonstrations,
direct action, worker mobilization, sophisticated corporate campaigns, and
circumvention of the [NLRB] election process." 61 These tactics have re-
turned some unions to their more radical roots by transforming them from
irrelevant bureaucratic organizations for contract administration to legitimate
forces in social movements aimed at extending fundamental social and eco-
nomic rights to workers around the world.
7 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
" See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199 (2010) (providing a more thorough discussion of the rise and
fall of the NLRA, a topic beyond the scope of this Essay).
" See, e.g., Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union
Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. Soc. 303, 311 (2000).
1 GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10 (2004); News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Union Members-2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
union2.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Voss & Sherman, supra note 59, at 304.
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II. THE LAWS ROLE IN SHAPING COAL MINE SAFETY
A. The Regulatory Floor of Rights So Strongly Correlates With Lower
Fatality Rates That the Data Suggest a Causal Relationship
Between Regulation and Safety
There are many good reasons for rejecting a deregulatory policy ap-
proach to coal mine safety and health.62 One important reason is that mine
safety regulation works.63 Coal mine safety legislation prior to the late-
1960s was enacted piecemeal.64 That period witnessed thousands of miner
fatalities. For example, between 1900 and 1909, the deadliest decade in U.S.
coal mining history, 3660 miners died in a total of 133 mine disasters. 65
That decade immediately preceded the first congressional attempt to regulate
mine safety for underground mines in the U.S.66 The 1910 Act established
the U.S. Bureau of Mines, a federal agency charged with mine safety re-
search and investigation. 67 The period between 1910 and 1969 witnessed a
significant decrease in absolute mining fatalities from 2831 deaths in 1910 to
311 deaths in 1968.68 But this decrease in absolute fatalities came in part
from a substantial decrease in labor used to extract coal. In 1910 U.S. coal
mines employed 725,030 miners; that number shrunk to 134,467 miners by
1968. Adjusting for the number of miners employed, the fatality rate
dropped from forty-eight per 10,000 miners in 1907 to a low of twelve
deaths per 10,000 miners in 1949, only to rise again in the 1950s and early
1960s.
62 See C. Gregory Ruffennach, Free Markets, Individual Liberties and Safe Coal Mines: A
Post-Sago Perspective, 111 W.VA. L. REv. 75, 76, 82-87 (2008) (favoring a market-based,
deregulatory approach to coal mine safety on grounds that "the current method of using the
federal government's authority to force compliance with regulations is . . . misguided").
63 See generally Edward Clair, Let's Not Abandon What Works, I 11 W. VA. L. Rev. 135
(2007) (showing a decreasing trend in mining fatalities and showing how that trend correlates
with mine safety regulation, including the efforts of MSHA and other federal agents); Michael
S. Lewis-Beck & John R. Alford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example,
74 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 745 (1980) (using time-series analysis to show that federal mine safety
regulations have worked).
' Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, History of Mine Safety
and Health Legislation, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
65 MICHAEL J. BRNICH, JR. & KATHLEEN M. KOWALSKI-TRAFKOFKER, UNDERGROUND
COAL MINE DISASTERS 1900-2010: EVENTS, RESPONSES, AND A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 2,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/NIOSHImining/pubs/pdfs/ucmdn.pdf.
' In 1891, Congress had passed mine safety legislation, which applied only to mines in
U.S. territories and focused on establishing minimum ventilation requirements for under-
ground mines and prohibiting child miners under age twelve. Id.
6 The Bureau of Mines Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-179, 36 Stat. 369 (1910). In 1995,
Congress dismantled the U.S. Bureau of Mines after eighty-five years. But in the wake of the
Upper Big Branch disaster, U.S. Senator Jay Rockefeller and others have called upon Congress
to re-establish that federal agency. Rusty Marks, Rockefeller Urges Obama to Crack Down on
Mine Safety, W. VA. GAZETTE, May 30, 2010, available at http://wvgazette.com/News/mont
coal/201005300577.
6
See BRNICH & KOWALSKI-TRAFKOFKER, supra note 65.
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Since 1969 Congress has passed three mine safety statutes all in re-
sponse to major disasters, all enacted to correct perceived failures-failures
that if remedied would save lives. The first comprehensive mine safety leg-
islation, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (the Coal
Act), came after the Farmington No. 9 mine explosion in West Virginia,
which claimed the lives of seventy-eight coal miners. 69 The Coal Act estab-
lished fines for all violations and criminal penalties for knowing and willful
violations.7 0 It also established procedures for developing improved mine
safety and health standards and provided compensation for miners disabled
by black lung disease.7'
In response to the 1976 Scotia mine disaster in Kentucky, which took
the lives of twenty-six miners and rescue workers in two explosions, Con-
gress passed the 1977 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (the Mine Act),
amending the 1969 Coal Act and consolidating all federal health and safety
regulations for the mining industry (coal and metal/nonmetal). 72 The Mine
Act, among other things, established the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) to enforce the Mine Act, established the indepen-
dent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) to
review MSHA's enforcement decisions, expanded miners' rights (including
rights against retaliation), and strengthened training requirements.7 1
In response to the 2006 Sago mine disaster, which claimed the lives of
twelve miners in West Virginia, Congress passed the Miner Improvement
and New Emergency Response Act (MINER Act).74 The MINER Act re-
quires underground mines to develop and continually update MSHA-certi-
fied, mine-specific, emergency response plans; to have wireless, two-way
communications and electronic tracking systems; to have two on-call, exper-
ienced rescue teams with one-hour response times. The MINER Act further
requires mine operators to notify MSHA within fifteen minutes of all inci-
dents and accidents that pose a reasonable risk of death (with fines between
$5,000 and $60,000 to be imposed on operators who fail to do so)." The
MINER Act also establishes a maximum $220,000 civil penalty for flagrant
offenses, and raises criminal penalties to $250,000 for first offenses and
$500,000 for second offenses. 76 The MINER Act empowers MSHA to re-
quest an injunction to shut down a mine where the mine has refused to pay
an MSHA final order penalty.77 It also promotes the development of ad-
6' Mine Safety and Health Admin., supra note 64; MSHA Historical Data, supra note 5.
70 30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (2006).
7130 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2006).
72 30 U.S.C. § 961 (2006).
73 30 U.S.C. § 811 (2006).
74 See 30 U.S.C §§ 826, 965 (2006).
71 See 30 U.S.C. § 813 (2006) (detailing inspections, investigations, and record-keeping);
§ 820 (laying out civil and criminal fines); § 876 (detailing the requirements for communica-
tion facilities, locations, and emergency response plans).
76 30 U.S.C. § 820(a), (d) (2006).
7 30 U.S.C. § 818 (2006).
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vanced practices, including improved technology, to protect miner safety."
Fatalities continued to decrease after enactment of 1969 Coal Act and the
1977 Mine Act.
There are at least four significant differences between the pre-compre-
hensive mine safety legislation (1969 and before) and the post-comprehen-
sive mine safety legislation (regulatory period). First, the absolute number
of mining fatalities has dropped significantly from a high of 3242 deaths in
1907 to a low of twenty-three deaths in 2005. But that statistic doesn't tell
us much because the number of miners has also dropped significantly. Sec-
ond, the number of mining fatalities per 10,000 miners has dropped signifi-
cantly during the regulatory period, from a high of forty-eight deaths per
10,000 miners to a low of two deaths per 10,000 miners achieved in 1997,
1998, 2005, and 2008. This statistic, which is captured in Graph I as a
percentage, is much more meaningful because it compares like rather than
unlike data. In other words, this statistic compares the number of deaths per
10,000 miners for both the pre-regulatory and the regulatory periods. Third,
the year-to-year variation in coal mining fatalities has dropped significantly.
Variation is important because it tells us whether we can predict fatalities in
any given year. During the pre-regulatory period, it was very difficult to
predict the number of annual fatalities because there was so much year-to-
year variation in the annual death rate. But during the regulatory period,
fatalities have consistently remained under 260 deaths during the Coal Act
period, under 153 deaths since enactment of the Mine Act, and under sixty-
eight deaths since 1985.









880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
7 See 30 U.S.C. § 801 (2006) (declaring as one of the purposes of the act "to improve and
expand . . . research and development and training programs aimed at preventing coal or other
mine accidents and occupationally caused diseases in the industry").
" See Mine Safety and Health Admin., Coal Fatalities for 1900 Through 2009, available
at http://www.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp.
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Critics will point to the fact that fatalities have been on a downward
trend throughout the entire pre-regulatory period and perhaps conclude that
the free market eventually would have brought the fatalities rates down to
the regulatory levels. But even though this downward trend is true, the con-
clusion is not. As explained below and captured in Graph 2, the statistical
difference between averages in the pre-regulatory and the post-regulatory
periods is so great that the occurrence of such a large difference in averages
happening by chance is exceedingly small.







1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
As Graph 2 shows, the post-regulatory slope is much flatter, which
means that there is little change in the number of deaths per year between
1973 and 2008. This suggests that the regulation not only brought down the
number of fatalities but also made that number predictable. Such stability in
coal mine fatality rates allows businesses to properly assess risk. It also
s Jim Heiko, a WVU graduate student in statistics, prepared this graph based on data
found at Mine Safety and Health Admin., supra note 79. Statistical analysis on file with
author.
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allows workers to make more rational workplace choices to the extent this
information is shared with employees or their representatives.
The question for further research is whether other factors, such as better
technology, surface mining, and mining size, have contributed to the reduc-
tion and stabilization of fatality numbers. That question has been examined,
with some scholars concluding that those factors did not significantly con-
tribute to either reduction or stabilization.'
To conclude, the tight statistical correlation between mine safety/health
regulations and fatality rates is powerful evidence that regulation works and
is justified. This appears to be the attitude of top-level, non-political (career)
federal agents. As former U.S. Department of Labor Associate Solicitor for
Mine Safety and Health, Ed Clair, proclaimed in 2007, MSHA is "searching
to find what could be done to get to the next level . . . that would bring us
down further towards zero [fatalities]."82
B. The New Legislative Focus
1. Enforcing Extant Regulations
To paraphrase Ed Clair, the question for policy makers now is what will
take us to the next level. Events surrounding the UBB explosion suggest
two potential failures, both of which are correctible. Although more detailed
answers to these questions may come out of the UBB investigation, many
already believe that the main problem lies less with increasing regulatory
standards and more with enforcing extant standards. The proposed amend-
ments to mine safety legislation focus more on accountability, enforcement
(including enhanced penalties), and whistleblower protection.83 To help hold
mine operators accountable, the bill bolsters MSHA's pattern of violation
process. Mines with a pattern of significant safety problems including a
pattern of "citations for significant and substantial violations," "withdrawal
orders," "flagrant violations," or "accidents, injuries, or illnesses" will be
placed on the pattern of violation status, which would result in ordering the
mine operator to withdraw all miners from the mine and keep them out until
the violations or unsafe conditions have been remedied.8 4 It also ensures that
irresponsible operators are held accountable by increasing maximum crimi-
" See generally Lewis-Beck & Alford, supra note 63; George R. Neumann & Jon P.
Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of
1969, 25 J. LAW & EcoN. 183, 198 (1982) (concluding that "[i]f increased safety is inter-
preted to be a decline in the probability of a fatal accident, then the evidence indicates that the
Act brought about safer work conditions" but commenting on whether that is a wise definition
of safety).
82 See Clair, supra note 63, at 136.
83 See H.R. 5663, 11Ith Cong. (2010), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/documents/
Il l/pdf/legislation/MineSafeyasreported-HR5663.pdf. For a summary of the bill, see Office
of Sen. Tom Harkin et al., Proposed Legislative Changes to Protect the Safety of All Workers
and Prevent Future Disasters, available at http://edlabor.house.gov/documents/l11/pdf/publi-
cations/20100629MinerSafetyActFivePageOverview.pdf.
SH.R. 5663 § 202.
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nal penalties and increasing maximum civil penalties for significant and sub-
stantial violations." To ensure that penalties are timely paid, the law grants
MSHA authority to withdraw miners from a mine that is more than 180 days
in payment arrears. 6
2. Reducing the Temptation to Evade the Law
Economists would likely predict that, assuming perfect competition (a
big assumption for the mining industry), the free market would lead to the
most efficient result-but not to fewer deaths. Thus, those who favor an
unregulated industry are not contending that there would be fewer fatalities.
Instead, they are contending that there would be an efficient number of fatal-
ities. In other words, death is the cost of doing business.17 As shown below,
the regulated state results in fewer deaths but preventing those deaths costs
more money than permitting those deaths. Thus, the regulated state may
also result in lower profits.





There would be more fatalities and more profits in the free market than
in the regulated market. But, in theory, the free market is more efficient, as
opposed to safer, because the cost of paying for those deaths is less than the
cost of regulation. The difference in profits between the regulated and un-
regulated state is the cost of doing business, which includes the cost of main-
8- H.R. 5663 §§ 301-304.
86 H.R. 5663 § 305.
87 See Neumann & Nelson, supra note 81, at 197-98 (concluding that the regulations may
have contributed in part to decreased productivity in the post-1970 period and that fatalities
have also decreased and arguing that this may not be the best trade-off).
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taining state and federal safety levels (cost of regulation) minus any costs
associated with fatalities (death costs) that would have occurred but for the
regulation.
Evasion of the law can result when some industry players are tempted
to recapture these lost profits. They do this by figuring out ways to circum-
vent the regulation. These methods might include paying "look outs" to
alert the mine operators that mine inspectors are on their way, which gives
mine operators time to "clean up" the mine-temporarily fixing safety
hazards that are cited only to return to lower safety standards in between
inspections-and making frivolous citation appeals to delay paying fines or
fixing safety hazards. Such evasions might be reduced if mine operators
were enabled to recapture their lost profits through subsidies and tax breaks.
Lessening the incentive to break the law might thus lead to better safety.
C. Summary
Given the current turnover in the House of Representatives, it is unclear
whether the proposed mine safety legislation will pass at all, let alone in
some manner similar to its present form. And while these amendments, if
passed, may very well make legal circumvention less likely, policy makers
should nevertheless question whether these regulations do all that can be
done to produce a safer workplace. The current regulatory framework is not
perfect. There continue to be many market failures that the Mine Act and its
amendments do not fully cure, including the problem that regulation is use-
less if not enforced. This leads to two questions. First, are there some sup-
plementary, nonregulatory means for making enforcement more likely?
Second, is there some way of making coal mines safer without increasing
regulation? Fortunately, federal mine safety legislation creates a floor, not a
ceiling, of rights. Federal mine safety legislation does not preempt many
state tort law claims."8 More relevant to this Essay, federal mine safety leg-
islation does not preempt greater protections for miners imposed by con-
tract.i9 Accordingly, it would be useful to examine the union-mine setting to
determine whether we can learn something about safety from union mines.
Have union mines valued or dignified workers by increasing health and
safety without a significant production loss?
" See, e.g., Echard v. Devine, 726 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. W. Va. 1989) (holding that the
Mine Act does not preempt a discharged miner's state law claim of retaliatory discharge even
though the Mine Act contains whistleblower remedies because the federal scheme, which con-
tains no preemption language, was meant to be supplemented); Collins v. Elkay Mining Co.,
179 W. Va. 549, 554 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that coal miners need not exhaust administrative
remedies under federal and state coal mine health and safety laws before instituting state com-
mon law retaliatory discharge action); Wiggins v. E. Assoc. Coal Corp., 178 W.Va. 63 (W. Va.
1987) (observing that "there was no legislative intent to make the remedies detailed in the
antidiscrimination portions of the [mine] safety statutes exclusive").
' See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368 (1974)
(holding that the Coal Act does not preempt agreements to arbitrate safety conditions).
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III. LEARNING FROM UNION MINES: THE CASE FOR SELF-REGULATION
ATOP A FLOOR OF RIGHTS
Policy makers have been left with the decisions of how and how much
to regulate coal mine health and safety. In making those decisions, it is
instructive to identify the failures that safety regulations are designed to re-
pair. With respect to underground coal mining in Appalachia, we know that
those workers lack meaningful choices because of the scarcity of job oppor-
tunities outside the coal mining industry and the monopsonistic power of
that industry. Any voice these workers may have is all too often drowned
out by messages whose volume is magnified by money. Below, I explore
several market failures: inequality of bargaining power; difficulty in assess-
ing risk in coal mining; asymmetrical information between coal mine opera-
tors and miners, especially concerning legal rights; asymmetrical
information between experienced and inexperienced miners; and
monopsony.
A. Market Failures in the Union and Nonunion Context
The observed power disparity between coal mine operators and coal
miners discussed above translates into a bargaining power imbalance that the
NLRA was designed to address. Unfortunately, although most coal opera-
tors have lawyers to counsel them, many miners, especially nonunion, do not
know their rights and therefore cannot act strategically in negotiations or
effectively wield their individual economic power. For example, many non-
union miners may not know that they have the right to walk off the job with
co-miners over safety concerns and that, if discharged, a federal government
lawyer would represent their interests before a federal agency to secure their
reinstatement with back pay.90 Increased awareness of legal rights such as
these would increase miners' bargaining power generally by encouraging
them to band together for mutual aid and protection even in the absence a
union.
In any event, individual miners are not particularly good at bargaining
on their own behalf for at least two reasons. First, individual miners are not
likely to be skilled negotiators or have even a superficial understanding of
the floor of rights on which all coal mine operators must function. They are
essentially bargaining without full knowledge. Second, notwithstanding the
fact that many mine risks are well known, some coal miners, like most peo-
ple, may not be good at assessing personal risk-or may be fatalistic about
that risk. This is particularly true of inexperienced coal miners as opposed to
experienced miners, given that new miners presumably are both less adept at
assessing risk because of their youth and less knowledgeable about safety
" See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18 (1962) (holding that an
employer may not discharge at-will employees for impermissibly and spontaneously walking
out of their jobs to protest working conditions).
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issues, knowing only that mines can be unsafe if regulations are not
followed.
Unions improve this situation in at least two ways, both of which bring
greater rationality to the bargaining process." First, with respect to bargain-
ing skill and power, union mines employ skilled negotiators, including law-
yers, who possess comprehensive knowledge of labor and other workplace
laws that allow them to negotiate with more open eyes. Union representa-
tives are experienced in understanding safety risks and therefore are more
likely to make rational choices among safety, wage, and job security trade-
offs in the collective-bargaining process. Second, with respect to risk as-
sessment, union representatives are essentially political leaders who make
demands for and appeal to the median voter-the experienced miner who
better understands safety risks and will want unions to voice that concern.12
Some coal operators, such as Performance Coal Company, understand
these dynamics and attempt to increase nonunion workforce participation in
mining by appealing, not to the median worker, but to the marginal worker,
the last worker to enter the labor market, by enticing that worker with en-
hanced wage agreements. As described above, those agreements give the
marginal worker a salary enhancement in exchange for less mobility-even
in the face of safety violations. In effect, the exit option-quitting-is more
expensive for those workers who agree to the noncompete clause and who
agree to repay the wage enhancement in the event of termination. These
agreements make the voice option-unionization or some other form of in-
dustrial democracy-all the more valuable, especially in the case of
monopsony.93
Given union expertise about safety and a union's tendency to play to the
experienced miner, one would predict that union mines would be more vigi-
lant about enforcing current safety regulations than nonunion mines, whose
workers may be less experienced, less informed, or both. Moreover, union
shops have greater incentives to be vigilant because they are representing
their own interests, including interests in personal safety and long-term
health. Accordingly, they may trade some money for long-term health bene-
fits. By contrast, management tends to unilaterally impose working condi-
tions onto nonunion mines, where individual miners have little or no voice
option. The tendency, therefore, is not to be as concerned with safety as
with profit maximization. And, as explained, individual bargaining is not a
sufficiently empowered voice to change that calculus.
9' Compare Steven N. Wiggins & Al H. Ringleb, Adverse Selection and Long-Term
Hazards: The Choice Between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules, 21 J. LEGAL Sruo.
189, 197 (1992) ("only those workers who are unduly optimistic will be employed in [coal
mining in the eastern United States]"), with Jason Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Soci-
ety: A Rational Actor Approach to the Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk
Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 747, 750-51 (2003) ("People increasingly choose to engage in
risky activities because they rationally know that the health risks of those activities have fallen
dramatically and rationally expect continued decreases in risk").
92 See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
" I would like to thank Dr. Clifford Hawley for raising this point with me.
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Given these observed labor-market failures, we must ask the following
question: What role has the law played, and what role should it play (what
do we owe these workers) to ensure worker safety and health in return for
worker bravery in the coal fields?
B. Union Mine Safety Records
The data support the proposition that union mines are safer than nonun-
ion mines. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, a lit-
tle over twenty-six percent of underground miners are unionized. 94 In
Appalachia, that number is closer to twenty-eight percent and in West Vir-
ginia, that number is a little over thirty percent.95 Yet, according to data
provided by the United Mine Workers, only twenty-one of 179 fatalities
(11.7%) between 2004 and 2009 were UMWA union members. This
amounts to an average of 3.5 deaths per year, as compared with almost thirty
total deaths per year.96 In the past twenty years, there have been seven min-
ing disasters, most of which occurred at a nonunion mine. As the chart
below indicates, five of those disasters occurred between 2001 and 2010,
and four of those occurred since the Sago mine explosion in January 2006.91
Date Location Union/Nonunion Fatalities
04/05/10 UBB Mine, WV nonunion 29
08/06/07 Crandall Canyon, UT nonunion 6
05/20/06 Darby Mine No. 1, KY nonunion 5
01/02/06 Sago, WV nonunion 12
09/23/01 No. 5 Mine, AL union 13
12/07/92 No. 3 Mine, VA unknown 8
09/13/89 William Station No. 9, KY nonunion 10
While union mines do not have perfect safety records, the data give us suffi-
cient basis to ask the following two questions: (1) What are union mines
I See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2009, at tbl.20 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/table20.pdf.
9 See id.
96 Interview with Linda Raisovich-Parsons, Deputy Administrator, Occupational Health
and Safety, United Mine Workers of America (Jul. 1-2, 2010).
" MSHA Historical Data, supra note 5. Citations establishing the nonunion status of the
UBB, Crandall Canyon, Darby and Sago mines can be found supra note 5. See also UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, UMWA REPORT ON JIM WALTER RESOURCES No. 5 COAL MINE
DISASTER 3 (2003) available at http://www.umwa.org/files/documents/UMWA_- JWR_- Report.
pdf (No.5 Mine, AL); Berry Craig, Union Mines are Safer: Ask Tim Miller, Whose 10 Co-
Workers Died in Mine Blast, AFL-CIO Now BLOG (May 4, 2010), http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/
05/04/union-mines-are-safer-ask-tim-miller-whose-10-co-workers-died-in-mine-blast/ (Wil-
liam Station No. 9).
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doing to keep their miners safe? And (2) what failures are occurring in non-
union mines that union mines are remedying?
C. Union Safety Committees
Union mines contractually mandate joint industry health and safety
committees.98 The industry committee that is mandated under the United
Mine Workers' master collective-bargaining agreement has six members,
three appointed by the union and three appointed by the employer.99 The
agreement mandates that one union committee member and one employer
committee member "shall have special knowledge and expertise in coal
mine health matters." 00 Consistent with federal law, the agreement further
compels the committee to "consult with the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration and/or representatives of the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices" to "review," "develop[ ]," and "revis[e]"o'0 "improved mandatory
health and safety standards." 02
The UMWA master agreement also mandates mine health and safety
committees at each mine.103 Each safety committee is "made up of miners
employed at the mine who are qualified by mining experience or training
and selected by the local union."'0" The committee members are trained at
the union and the employer's joint expense. 0
The safety committees have enormous power. They "may inspect any
portion of a mine," including the "surface installations, dams or waste im-
poundments and gob piles connected" with that mine, so long as they give
management "sufficient advance notice of an intended inspection" to allow
an employer representative to accompany the committee, if it so chooses to
participate.106 The safety committees are also empowered to shut down a
mine "[i]f the committee believes that an imminent danger exists." 07 In
these circumstances, the employer must "follow the [c]ommittee's recom-
mendation and remove the [e]mployees from the involved area
immediately." 0




10 Id. Section 10 1(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which is refer-
enced in the agreement, directs the Secretary of Labor to "develop, promulgate, and revise ...
improved mandatory health or safety standards for the protection of life and prevention of
injuries in coal or other mines." 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (200).
"o3 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 2007, supra note 39, at art. IHl, § (d)(1).
'0 Id.
'o Id. at art. III, § (d)(2).
' Id. at art. III, § (d)(3), (4).
107 Id. at art. III, § (d)(3).
ioi Id.
1072011]
108 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 5
D. Union and Nonunion Miners' Fundamental Rights Under the NLRA
The development of these contractual safety committees is built on the
labor-management bargaining model. Miners are statutory employees, "9
and coal mine operators are statutory employers"o under the NLRA.' That
means that all miners are entitled to the fundamental rights embodied in
NLRA Section 7, including the right to self-organize, "to form, join, or as-
sist unions," to "bargain collectively through representatives" chosen by
employees through either a secret-ballot election or by card check, to band
together concertedly for "mutual aid or protection," and to "refrain from
any or all such activities.""l2 That also means that miners possess the funda-
mental right to strike, which may not be "interfere[d] with or impede[d] or
diminish[ed] in any way . . . or . . . limit[ed] or qualif[ied)."" 3
Significantly, these rights belong directly to employees, and only deriv-
atively to unions. That means that both union and nonunion employees pos-
sess the statutorily protected right to band together concertedly for mutual
aid or protection.114 But, while union miners often may not be allowed to
strike because they have contractually bound themselves to resolve disputes
through the grievance-arbitration machinery embodied in no-strike clauses
and grievance-arbitration clauses in their collective-bargaining agree-
ments," 5 nonunion miners may spontaneously walk off the job for mutual
" The NLRA defines employee as "any employee, and shall not be limited to the em-
ployees of a particular employer," unless otherwise excluded from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (2006). None of the enumerated exemptions apply to coal miners, except possibly
the supervisory exemption that would exclude coal mining foremen from the NLRA's protec-
tion and the independent contractor exemption that might exempt "rent-a-miners" or contract
miners who work periodically at coal mines. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the statutory term
"employee," see Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2010).
"o NLRA Section 2(2) defines employer as "any person acting as an agent of an em-
ployer, directly or indirectly," unless otherwise excluded. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). None
of the enumerated exemptions apply here.
1" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (2006).
112 The NRLA provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
' Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
114 The Board, with Supreme Court approval, has broadly interpreted the mutual aid or
protection clause to include the concerted activity of unorganized (at-will) employees. See
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18 (1962). The company's brief to the
Supreme Court makes clear that it viewed the Board's decision as interfering with the em-
ployer's right to discharge within the confines of the at-will relationship. See Brief for Respon-
dent-Appellee at 28-33, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1961) (No. 61-464),
1962 WL 115796, at *28-*33.
"' See, e.g., National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 2007, supra note 39, at art.
XXXIII (grievance-arbitration clause); see also Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (holding that, where the collective bargaining agreement contains the duty
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aid or protection, and the nonunion coal mine operator may not discharge
them for walking off the job in those circumstances." 6
IV. NEXT STEPS: EXTENDING THE UNION MODEL TO NONUNION MINES
This Essay argues in favor of extending the union model to nonunion
mines. This could be done in several ways. First, it could be accomplished
indirectly by strengthening Section 7 rights, especially organizing rights for
all workers, thereby making it more likely that all coal miners will eventu-
ally be union-represented. In particular, Congress could amend the NLRA
to eliminate the employer's judicially created right to insist on an election
when faced with a valid card majority. The NLRA's plain language man-
dates that "[rlepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.""'7 In
1974, the Supreme Court judicially amended that plain language when, in
Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, it held that employers-not employees-
have the right to insist on an election, even when faced with a valid card
majority."'
Re-empowering workers by allowing them to choose their own repre-
sentatives with less employer interference than is currently tolerated under
the NLRA was the solution posited in the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA). EFCA directs the NLRB to certify unions in cases in which the
Board, after investigation, "finds that a majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating the
individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining
representative and that no other individual or labor organization is currently
certified or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the employ-
ees in the unit." EFCA further clarifies that "the Board shall not direct an
election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the
representative."" 9
For reasons that many have explored in other articles, this is not an easy
fix.120 The NLRA and the Board have been rendered ineffective for some
to submit dispute resolution to final and binding arbitration, a strike to resolve that dispute
violates an implied no-strike clause).
" 6 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18 (1962).
1" 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
"18 419 U.S. 301 (1974) (upholding the Board's construction of Section 9).
"I' H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). See generally Benjamin 1. Sachs, Enabling Employee
Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REv. 655
(2010).
120 See, e.g., Lofaso, supra note 58; Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The Latest
Battle in the War on Workers' Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, ACS ISSUE
BRIEFS, June 11, 2008, http://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20September%20Massacre.pdf;
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time.' 2' EFCA's attempt to countermand employer frustration of unioniza-
tion, by using the current Board law (captive audience speeches to defeat
unionization) and the Board's administrative processes to delay, is so politi-
cally radioactive that it failed to pass Congress, notwithstanding two years of
majority support for that bill in both the House and the Senate. Given the
recent Republican takeover of the House, EFCA will remain shelved for at
least another two years.
A variation of this first solution would be to amend the NLRA, the
Mine Act, or both to mandate certification of coal mine unions based on card
checks. Congress could establish a new division of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board-the Coal Labor Panel-that specializes in the coal mining in-
dustry. The Coal Labor Panel would have exclusive authority to certify coal
mining unions through card check; in other words, coal operators would not
have the right to insist on an election. This would make organizing coal
mines much easier, just as EFCA would make organizing labor in general
much easier. Again, this solution is unlikely to gain traction given the cur-
rent political climate, in which unions are blamed for high unemployment
rates.
The union model could also be extended to nonunion mines by amend-
ing either the Mine Act or the NLRA to mandate unions in the coal mining
industry. In other words, rather than employees having a choice between
representation (union) or no representation in NLRB elections or card
checks, mining employees would have a choice among various unions to
represent their interests.
A more modest version of this solution would be to mandate bargaining
over health and safety in the coal industry regardless of whether the miners
are union represented. This option is more akin to extending union safety
committees to all workplaces. And perhaps mandating safety committees in
nonunion mines would be an even more modest version of this already mod-
est proposal. The question that would need to be addressed is whether these
committees have bargaining rights or merely consultation rights. But either
way, it would be imperative that these committees be independent of man-
agement (accordingly, they must be elected by the coal miners themselves),
that they have the power to shut down a mine that is not in compliance with
the regulations, and that they are protected by whistleblower and anti-retalia-
tion remedies.
Perhaps the most modest possibility is to mandate labor posters in every
mine-union and nonunion-describing Section 7 rights to miners, includ-
ing the right of nonunion miners to walk off the job for safety reasons.122
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527
(2002).
121 See generally Symposium, 6 FLA. INrk U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
122 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-18 (1962) (holding that an
employer may not discharge at-will employees for spontaneously walking off their jobs to
protest working conditions without permission).
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This legal change could be accomplished in several ways-by Executive
Order (at least in cases involving government contracts), legislative amend-
ment to the NLRA (mandating such postings in all workplaces), legislative
amendment to the Mine Act (thereby mandating the change only in coal
mines), or NLRB rulemaking.
With the exception of whistleblower protection, the Robert C. Byrd
Miner Safety and Health Act of 2010 ignores all of these policies to augment
industrial democracy in favor of increasing mine operator accountability
through criminal sanctions, better use of the patterns and violations sanc-
tions, and better enforcement tools such as agency subpoena authority.
Given Congress's inability to pass a single substantial amendment to the
NLRA since 1959 and the Board's aversion to engaging in rulemaking,123 the
likelihood that any of these solutions will be implemented by changing labor
law is small, especially given the current political climate. A possible ex-
ception is the modest change of requiring union and nonunion workplaces to
post a summary of employees' labor rights, which the NLRB has taken steps
to implement through rulemaking.124 The best chance of significant change
would be to amend the Mine Act, which has been successfully amended
twice since 1969 and is likely to be amended again in the near future. The
problem is, many of these potential solutions require changes in private-
sector labor law, which history tells us is difficult because special interests
have fought tooth and nail to block any legislation that enhances worker
voice and empowerment. Accordingly, it may actually be easier to create an
entirely new labor regulatory scheme for the coal mining industry (or per-
haps energy industries more generally) in much the same way the law has
carved out sections of the transportation industry under the Railway Labor
Act.
None of these solutions is meant to supplant the regulatory floor of
rights, which undoubtedly improves miners' bargaining power. But to make
a tangible difference, remedies associated with those rights should be
strengthened. In particular, it would probably be necessary to authorize
treble back-pay damages for coal miners who are retaliated against for exer-
cising their rights or for engaging in safety-related whistleblowing.
But even assuming every coal miner in the country could be organized,
safety will not improve if coal operators continue to circumvent the regula-
tory floor of rights. So we must question whether an organized workforce
bargaining atop a regulatory floor of rights is sufficient to prevent such law-
123 See MEL HAAS, ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE "OBAMA" NATIONAL LA-
BOR RELATIONS BOARD: THE POTENTIAL USE OF RULEMAKING To ENHANCE UNION ORGANIZ-
ING 3-8 (2010), available at http://www.uschamber.comlsites/default/files/reports/1008
obamanlrb.pdf ("[T]he National Labor Relations Board has rarely utilized its rulemaking au-
thority to issue substantive rules of law . . . .").
124 See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 104).
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lessness. The answer is probably not. We should therefore consider enforc-
ing and strengthening criminal sanctions, which might entail jail time for
those responsible for maintaining health and safety precautions, including
(and perhaps especially) the coal operators' chief executive officers.'25
Given the current political climate, perhaps the best option for workers is for
unions to target nonunion miners with poor records for corporate social re-
sponsibility campaigns.
CONCLUSION
Coal mine operators possess greater bargaining power than coal miners.
The conditions resulting in this disparity of bargaining power are precisely
those conditions that Congress intended to ameliorate when it passed the
NLRA. A comparison between the pre- and post-regulatory fatality rates in
coal mines strongly supports the conclusion that current regulations make
coal mines safer. Those regulations raise the floor of rights on top of which
unions bargain, thereby further addressing the disparity of bargaining power
between coal operators and coal miners and making it more likely that un-
ions will bargain for even better safety conditions than current regulations
permit. That conclusion is supported by data, which show that modern
union mines do in fact have lower fatality rates than nonunion mines. Ac-
cordingly, it makes sense for policy makers to consider bringing the union
model into the nonunion coal mine.
This Essay suggests several methods for bringing the union model to
the nonunion coal mine. Its most radical solution is to compel union repre-
sentation for all coal miners. But even more modest proposals, such as post-
ing miners' rights, are likely to meet fierce resistance among those who have
a vested interest in circumventing safety regulations (as well as those who
have a vested interest in keeping miners disempowered).
Significantly, the policies suggested in this Essay represent a very dif-
ferent approach to coal mine safety. In the past forty years, Congress has
successfully dealt with mine safety issues by increasing regulations in re-
sponse to disasters. Given this trend, this Essay makes the following sug-
gestion. Although it is important to maintain current safety regulations
because they work, empowering workers through some form of industrial
democracy would be, to paraphrase Ed Clair, a more efficient way of bring-
ing us further toward zero fatalities.
This Essay also shows that the coal mining industry provides a valuable
case study for how to approach safety and health issues arising in crucial
industries. Coal mining is dangerous if legal and technical safety require-
ments are not followed. But the question of worker safety cuts across jobs
and industries. Oil extraction, fishing, logging, farming, ranching, and con-
125 Cf Lynn Rhinehart, Workers at Risk: The Unfulfilled Promises of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, Ill W.Va. L. Rev. 117, 133-34 (2008) (arguing in favor of greater
criminal sanctions for health and safety violations under the OSH Act).
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struction are other examples of dangerous but crucial jobs. Dangerous jobs
in industries that the public perceives to be vital to its comfort and security
may be here to stay, but that does not mean that the public shouldn't demand
that policy makers focus on questions of human life and dignity in the con-
text of these crucial multi-billion dollar industries. Simply put, studying
coal mine safety and health as a case study forces us to acknowledge the
human cost we are asking a class of workers to bear in response to the global
demand for energy. Acknowledging that cost is a first step in valuing
human life; the next step is to incorporate that value into the justification of
dangerous jobs in crucial industries.

